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Environmentally-related migration is often cited as one of the human
consequences of environmental stress, especially in the context of climate
change. Nonetheless, there is a lack of effective and appropriate governance
strategies that address the issue due to the complex and multicausal charac-
ter of environmentally-related migration and the tendency to discuss the
issue through security-based discourses that favor alarmist narratives.
This paper suggests alternative approaches in responding to environmen-
tally-related migration that seek to avoid these pitfalls. Through the case of
Bangladesh, this paper illustrates the need to form cross-sectoral governance
policies that avoid oversimplifying environmentally-related migration. Spe-
cifically, the paper highlights the limits and dangers of the security-based
framework to environmentally-related migration and calls for policy coordi-
nation as a potential pathway forward.
Introduction
A growing and confident body of work asserts that environmentally-
related migration is a logical and at times inevitable ramification of environ-
mental change. Such projections come from traditional security communi-
ties (e.g., CNA, 2007; Jane’s, 2009), intergovernmental bodies (e.g., UN
Department of Public Information, 2007, 2011; UNDP, 2008; IPCC, 2007;
ADB, 2012), as well as think tanks and academia (e.g., Myers and Kent, 1995;
Smith and Vivekananda, 2007; Stern, 2007; Campbell et. al., 2007; Dupont,
2008; White, 2011). General currents of these otherwise diverse arguments
suggest that environmental factors, such as water scarcity, cyclones or sea-
level rise, may cause migration across but mainly within national borders
(e.g., Foresight Project, 2011).
However, such attention to the issue of environmentally-related migra-
tion has thus far yielded few tangible improvements in governance at either
international or domestic levels. One key reason explaining such inaction is
the complex nature of the phenomenon of environmentally-related migra-
tion, which is characterized by multi-faceted causal pathways and highly
varying characteristics in different settings (Ewing, 2010, 2012; Ullah, 2004).
It is difficult in the first place to neatly attribute specific human activities to
changing environmental and climatic conditions; as such changes typically
reflect a range of interactions between human activities and environmental
settings. Floods, for instance, do not occur simply because of heavy rain, but
rather because such precipitations outstrip water management systems.
Likewise, salinity intrusion in southern Bangladesh follows from sea-level
rise or cyclones, but also from large-scale shrimp farming. Even as such
relationships between societies and natural environments become better
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understood, the ramifications of environmental changes and abrupt events
still intrinsically depend upon the social contexts in which they play out.
Similarly, people do not move simply because temperatures get higher,
resources become scarcer or weather conditions worsen. Rather, people
move because such environmental changes have social and economic
consequences on their lives and livelihoods, policies prove incapable of
mitigating these consequences, and better conditions are thought to exist
elsewhere (Foresight Project, 2011). These characteristics of environmen-
tally-related migration can problematize government action on the issue.
The myriad facets of population movements, driven in part by environmen-
tal changes, do not lend themselves to a clear demarcation of responsibili-
ties, coherent response agendas, or political impetuses for action. The result
is often a lack of mature governance structures for addressing the relation-
ship between environmental change and migration.
In the vacuum left by ineffective governance, fairly narrow security-
based narratives have come to frame much of the environmentally-related
migration discourse. Such approaches often argue that climate change may
spur large-scale movements across international borders, and in doing so
lead to insecurities at national and international levels (Dupont, 2008). The
complexities of migration dynamics render these claims difficult to validate
or refute outright, and frames which focus on wide-ranging security chal-
lenges risk underrepresenting the distinctive conditions that define indi-
vidual cases. These shortcomings, however, have not consistently impeded
the policy influence of security-based arguments. Rather, such security-
based positions have been made to promote at least three approaches to
governance, relating respectively to adaptation funding, emissions mitiga-
tion strategies, and traditional security policies more generally.
This paper argues that such security-based narratives on environmen-
tally-related migration create a number of problems. First, apocryphal
arguments about climate change and large-scale global instability, within
which population movements often feature heavily, reduce the complexity
of why people move to a degree that is not supported empirically. Such
reductive argumentation can prejudice certain causes over others and in
turn lead to narrow and constricted policy prescriptions. Second, highly
securitized frames, while drawing attention to some emergent challenges,
risk subverting the interests and conditions of the people involved in
migratory events to larger security considerations. Both migrating and
receiving people and communities often face potentially dire situations,
and subsuming these plights within strategic discourses is not the most
effective pathway for redressing them. Finally, there are morally hazardous
risks that environmental change and migration connections can be exagger-
ated or misrepresented to enable security policies that serve interests other
than those connected to the phenomenon itself.
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In response, this paper argues for rights-based approaches that account
for multicausal forces and a range of specific (e.g., environmental, cultural,
political, economic, and historical) circumstances affecting such migration.
Governance approaches need to resonate with human stories and the
perceptions of the migrants and receiving communities in order to effi-
ciently promote the full realization of rights. High levels of complexity need
not prevent such policy developments. For such action to be effective,
strategies need to encapsulate the multi-faceted nature of environmentally-
related migration within governance mechanisms. Otherwise, governance
mechanisms fail to resonate with the particular situations of the migrants
and communities vulnerable to environmental impacts, and are condemned
to be at best ineffective, at worst counterproductive and dangerous.
The paper is structured as follows. The first two sections discuss the
ways in which multicausality creates governance challenges for managing
environmentally-related migration. The first section concentrates on the
lack of concrete actions that effectively address environmentally-related
migration. The second section deals with the construction of environmen-
tally-related migration as a security issue, and argues that such approaches
risk creating ineffectively narrow forms of governance. Following from
these governance challenges, the third section suggests alternative rights-
based pathways for addressing environmentally-related migration that
embrace its multi-faceted nature and strive to place the interests of those
affected by environmentally-related migration at the center of governance
strategies.
The paper calls upon the case of Bangladesh to illuminate the manner
in which these governance challenges and proposals play out in vulnerable
settings and on an international level. Bangladesh is particularly exposed to
environmental and climate challenges, including extreme events, such as
cyclones, floods, storm surges, and droughts, as well as protracted environ-
mental processes, such as deforestation, salinity intrusion, and soil erosion,
among others. Moreover, the country’s high demographic density, low
development level, and tumultuous political circumstances impact Bang-
ladesh’s adaptive capacities (Lewis, 2011). Unsurprisingly, therefore, Bang-
ladesh is often cited as one the states most concerned with environmentally-
related migration (e.g., IOM, 2010), and thus provides an apt case-study to
illustrate the arguments provided in this paper.
Multicausality as an Impediment to Action
To date, the most significant international recognition of climate-related
migration lies in paragraph 14(f) of the “Cancun” Agreements adopted by
the 16th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Conven-
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tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2010), which called for “measures to
enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regards to
climate change-induced displacement, migration and planned relocation,
where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels.” Two
years later, parties to the UNFCCC (2012) reiterated this vague assertion by
recalling the need for “enhancing the understanding of … how impacts of
climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and hu-
man mobility.” A perhaps more promising step has been the recent launch
of the Consultative Committee of the Nansen Initiative by the governments
of Norway and Switzerland, aiming to agree on international guidelines for
cross-border displacement due to climate change and natural disasters. The
committee’s task is to “carry out a series of consultations with governments
and representatives of civil society in regions which are particularly af-
fected, on the basis of which a global dialogue will then be organized with
a view to formulating a protection agenda” (Reliefweb, 2012). Nonetheless,
it remains unclear how these developments will play out in future years and
whether new mechanisms at the international level will be forthcoming.
This general dearth of frameworks regarding environmentally-related
migrants should not be considered as the accidental consequence of insuf-
ficient institutional know-how. Rather, states and international institutions
continue to consciously avoid the topic at least in part because of the con-
ceptual indefiniteness surrounding the notion of environmentally-related
migration.
Compounding this problem is an oft-repeated amalgamation of envi-
ronmentally-related migrants and conventional refugees in an “environ-
mental refugee” narrative (Mayer, 2011b). Conventional refugees are indi-
viduals who are at risk of being persecuted because they are part of a certain
group in a given country of origin.1 Certainly, the determination of the
status of a conventional refugee raises many practical issues, if only because
refugees generally do not travel with documented evidence of their perse-
cution. However, the conceptual background at least is quite well estab-
lished. Therefore, the definition of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees is generally workable (despite some unavoidable
grey areas). Unlike conventional refugees, environmentally-related mi-
grants cannot be included in a clear-cut definition.
1 The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees refers to a “well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group
or political opinion” (art. 1(A)(2)).
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Unlike persecution, environmental stress does not distinguish between
people from different perceived “groups.” If environmentally-related mi-
grants from a given country are to be protected, there is no easy way to
distinguish between individuals fleeing an environmental phenomenon
and other migrants. Of course, it may be that an environmental phenom-
enon specifically impacts on a given region of a country. In certain circum-
stances, natural disasters, such as a cyclone or a flood, may displace specific
populations generally for a limited period of time, but slow-onset environ-
mental changes (including the repetition of natural disasters) usually have
less ascertainable immediate consequences for human settlement (Lilleor
and Van den Broeck, 2011). In particular, proving that one individual comes
from a region affected by environmental hazard(s) can be exceedingly
difficult given the fact that individuals often move internally before moving
internationally (Foresight Project, 2011). In other words, virtually any
individual leaving a country or a region affected by an environmental
phenomenon could have a reasonable claim to be an environmental mi-
grant. Environmentally-related migrants cannot readily be distinguished
from voluntary economic migrants, in part because they often are environ-
mentally-related economic migrants (people displaced by the economic
consequences of environmental phenomena). Such difficulties are inherent
to determining why a migrant has moved, and by extension create problems
for claiming that particular parties are responsible for managing any
resulting implications.2
Additionally, the conceptual ambiguity of the debate on environmen-
tally-related migration leads to two different argumentative appeals to the
notion of “responsibility;” either to call for a responsibility of the state
directly concerned (in this example, the government of Bangladesh), or to
call for a responsibility of the international community toward the affected
populations. On the one hand, external observers and some citizens may
highlight Bangladesh’s own “responsibility” vis-à-vis “its” “environmental
migrants” (McAdam, 2012; UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Migrants, 2012). Human rights law provides a sound general legal basis for
such claims. According to international human rights law, a state must
protect the population within its jurisdiction (International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, art. 2; International Covenant on Social, Economic
and Cultural Rights, art. 2). As in many other countries, such duties are
2 While climate change may increase environmental stresses and exacerbate migration,
there does not seem to be any obvious reason to foresee a general change in the nature of
environmentally-related migration (comp. Gemenne, 2011). Then, again, such scenarios are
hard to predict.
ENVIRONMENTALLY-RELATED MIGRATION 183
recognized in the constitution of Bangladesh (art.15). This notion of respon-
sibility is disconnected from any culpability and it is only rooted in distribu-
tive justice: the government of Bangladesh is responsible because it is “its”
population, not because it is its “fault.”
On the other hand, however, the government of Bangladesh (like other
affected states) has expressed strong claims of a “responsibility” of the
international community (Hasina, 2009a, 2009b, 2013). In these claims, the
notion of “climate refugee” is used to highlight a duty of the international
community. A general legal and political basis for this argument lies in the
concept of a common but differentiated responsibility (see discussion in
Biermann and Boas, 2010; Mayer, 2011a). In fact, the argument for an
international responsibility may itself be based on two different ideas
(Mayer, 2012). Most often, it is linked to the notion of culpability and the
implementation of a corrective justice framework: because states are re-
sponsible for climate change, they should assist Bangladesh’s efforts to deal
with its fallout. Legal notions, such as the no-harm principle and the res-
ponsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts, support this idea.
Alternatively, the argument for an international responsibility may be
framed as distributive justice, excluding any reference to culpability but
calling on some form of humanitarian duty of the international community.
Legal roots can be drawn from the analogy with the protection of refugees
(although different forms of protection would have to be invented), the duty
of international cooperation to the benefit of developing countries for the
protection of social, economic and cultural rights,3 or the extension of the
notion of a “responsibility to protect,” for now only recognized in cases of
genocide, war, crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (UN
Secretary General, 2009). Additional support to this argument can be found
in the use of a human rights language in international environmental
governance. The Cancun Agreement, for instance, “emphasize[d] that
Parties should, in all climate change-related actions, fully respect human
rights” (UNFCCC, 2010: para. 8).
Yet arguments for a global “responsibility” have not led to systematic
action. Similarly, Bangladesh and other affected countries fall short of their
rights-based “responsibilities” towards migratory populations under a
human rights framework. Despite being vociferous in international forums,
the government of Bangladesh has done little to effectively protect environ-
mentally-related migrants. While both national reports of Bangladesh on
3 International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (art. 2.3).
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climate change adaptation briefly mention migration as a consequence of
the adverse effects of climate change, they do not encourage any concrete
measures to address it within the national context (Government of Bang-
ladesh, 2005, 2008). In fact, the Bangladesh National Adaptation Plan of
Action only mentions the need to contain internal displacement, instead of
addressing environmentally-related migration as an adaptive strategy
providing livelihood opportunities for migrants (Government of Bangladesh,
2005). The official position of Bangladesh also denies cross-border migra-
tion between Bangladesh and India (Abul Kamal Azad, as cited in Fried-
man, 2009), although such movements are clearly part of the regional
history (Lewis, 2011; Ramachandran, 2005). These movements, related to
environmental changes (Swain, 1996), are a charged political issue in both
the Indian and Bangladeshi public discourses (Rajeswar, 2003; Makkar,
2009; Nagi, 2008). In a sign of possible progress, the Ministry of Environ-
ment and Forests took part in an international research consortium initiated
in 2012 with the University of Dhaka and the University of Sussex to
develop new knowledge on climate change, migration and governance in
Bangladesh. It is unclear whether the report expected by mid-2013 will be
followed by action by the Government.
A risk is that both the government of Bangladesh and the international
community use ambivalent notions of “responsibility” to avoid addressing
environmentally-related migration; instead projecting responsibility onto
the other. For example, promoting the right to international migration from
Bangladesh should not divert attention from the need for domestic mea-
sures such as housing improvements and the protection of land property
(Displacement Solutions, 2012). Bangladesh (like other countries) may seek
to circumvent its human rights responsibility by asserting the culpability of
the international community, while the international community may also
too quickly forget its own responsibility rooted in the climate change regime
and in ethical notions of global justice and global solidarity. Rather than
acting as mutual scapegoats, both systems can act in tandem – with
international support helping states comply with their human rights obliga-
tions. Under any circumstances, shortcomings in one sphere should not
excuse the inaction of the other.
Security-based Discourses and their Policy Implications
A second governance challenge associated with environmentally-related
migration is the propensity for security-based discourses to come to the
fore, which can in turn lead to suboptimal governance strategies. The
complex multicausal character of environmentally-related migration pro-
vides a conducive environment for irrational fears and security-based
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perspectives to arise. Scientific uncertainties and the angst flowing from the
unprecedented challenges raised by climate change also contribute to the
development of such perspectives.
A risk is that actors drawing on security-based discourses take advan-
tage of this space of uncertainty by emphasizing certain causes, figures,
estimates and consequences, while disregarding others, with a view to
dramatize and gain attention over the environment-migration issue.
Hartmann, for example, revealed the strategic use of climate-related migra-
tion to justify US military investments in Africa (2010). Likewise, the UK
Government has relied at times on alarmist narratives on climate change
and migration as a means to promote greater action by the international
community on the mitigation of climate change (Boas, 2012). In particular,
when identifying climate change as a primary cause of displacement (and
denying the multicausal origin of migration), such actors may draw on
alarmist estimates of millions of “climate refugees” and refer to direct
consequences of conflict and distress (Dupont, 2008; Muniruzzaman, 2013).
A report of the Norwegian Refugee Council, for instance, was emotively
titled “Future Floods of Refugees: A Comment on Climate Change, Conflict
and Forced Migration” (Kolmannskog, 2008). Söderblom, in a similar vein,
warned that “potentially millions of poor and unskilled regional neighbours
[will] come begging for a new life” and creating innumerable strains for
transit and receiving communities (2008). Bangladesh has long served as a
key source country for such arguments, and Myers (2002) has (in)famously
predicted that climate change would create 26 million Bangladeshi “envi-
ronmental refugees” by 2050. Among other problems, such reasoning risks
denigrating the role of non-environmental factors underpinning migration
trends, and often ignores the possibility that many migrants will remain
within their own country rather than cross international borders (Jager et al.,
2009:72; Foresight Project, 2011).
Security-based discourses predominantly also portray environmen-
tally-related migration as a threat to national and international stability,
triggering conflicts and mass movements towards the Global North (Kaplan,
1994; Beckett, 2006, 2007; CNA, 2007). As a logical source of such migration,
Bangladesh has been framed as a powder-keg for future instability. For
example, during her time as the UK’s Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett
had this to say in her advocacy to stakeholders: “imagine if rising sea levels,
as predicted, displaced millions of people in Bangladesh, that is bound to
raise tensions in an already volatile region” (2006). Such positions tend to
emphasize that Bangladesh is an underdeveloped country characterized by
increasing Islamist extremism and less than stable political institutions
(Campbell et al., 2007:5, 57; WBGU, 2008:3, 123; Muniruzzaman, 2011b; see
discussion in McAdam and Saul, 2010). Arguments suggest that its high
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physical vulnerability to climate change as a low-lying state, in combination
with rapid demographic changes, may trigger large-scale migration both
internally and abroad. Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was
quoted for example as saying that most climate change migrants “would
seek migration, and they would be from LDCs moving within their borders,
or beyond, and such movements would cause social disorders, political
instability, cross border conflicts, and upheavals” (The Daily Star, 2010).
Accordingly, these characteristics lead to Bangladesh featuring promi-
nently in discussions of climate security, mass migration, terrorism, chaos,
and threat for regional and international peace and security.
More specifically, such securitized discussions can be distinguished
into three forms of arguments. These have in common the tendency to deny
the complex causality of migration, to identify environmentally-related
migration as a security issue, and to plead for relatively narrow types of
solution – none of which necessarily benefits the situation of the environ-
mentally-related migrants. The first represents a preventive security para-
digm developed to encourage global action on the mitigation of climate
change. Key vocalizers of this line are NGOs, Western European govern-
ments, and some developing states highly vulnerable to climate change.
Such arguments use security as a rationale to push for ambitious and
binding mitigation policies to prevent perceived dangerous consequences
of climate change, including mass environmentally-related migration. This
reasoning was instrumental, for instance, in the UK’s decision to initiate a
UN Security Council debate in April 2007 on climate change and security
(UN Department of Public Information, 2007; Sindico, 2007:32; Boas, 2012).
Bangladesh represents an important partner to actors promoting mitigation
action on climate change by means of security-based discourses, due to its
perceived climate vulnerability and low adaptive capacities. In congress,
such countries can “generate a [human and moral] voice that will highlight
the impact of climate issues, including to exert more leverage within the UN
negotiations” (FCO, 2009:40).
The second security-based frame is the victim-compensation narrative,
which has been constructed particularly by developing states directly or
indirectly affected by climate change and by NGOs (sometimes in comple-
ment to the first narrative, as in the case of Bangladesh). The victim-com-
pensation discourse attempts to use security as a strategic tool to attract
adaptation funding (Baillat, 2012). The use of the notion of “climate refu-
gees” by the government of Bangladesh can be understood as a way to raise
awareness among the international community about the risks of insuffi-
cient adaptation in Bangladesh (Hasina, 2009a). The argument is that
affected states require assistance (and, in particular, financial support) to
deal internally with climate change adaptation, without which the interna-
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tional community would face mass influx of international “climate refu-
gees.” Such arguments have provided Bangladeshi leaders with a pulpit
from which to elicit international attention, as exemplified by Sheikh
Hasina’s 2011 address to the UN General Assembly in which she “de-
manded” that the “global community share the burden of climate migrants
and displaced people” (2011).
Thirdly, a military-industrial complex approach presents an additional
framing of environmentally-related migration challenges.4 This framing
sees security communities, such as the Ministries of Defense and security
think tanks, appropriate the issue of environmentally-related migration
into their storylines. These arguments were solidified during 2007 when
multiple key reports were released on climate change and security, portray-
ing environmentally-related migration as a major security threat (CNA,
2007; DCDC, 2007; Campbell et al., 2007). These works offer the traditional
security community with an expanded agenda in a post Cold-War era, thus
allowing them to justify important new activities (Deudney, 1990). One can
trace these shifts to Bangladesh as well. For instance, Major General Muni-
ruzzaman, a retired senior officer from the Bangladesh Army and current
President of the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, pro-
motes a greater role for the military in capacity-building activities and
responses to natural disasters by referring to a scenario of mass migration
and climate conflict (Muniruzzaman, 2011a).
Meanwhile, media and civil society actors play a growing role in the
development of these storylines as they tend to highlight dramatic trends on
environmentally-related migration. Indian news articles for instance claim
that Bangladeshis “may inundate India” (Nagi, 2008), which is highly
problematic given that India “is already facing a huge problem of illegal
Bangladeshi migrants who are a burden on its economy” (Makkar, 2009).
NGOs, such as Greenpeace India, further fuel a notion of insecurity by
referring to 75 million possible climate migrants from Bangladesh and by
stating that “[the] bulk of people from Bangladesh are very likely to
immigrate to India” (Rajan, 2008:1; See  Christian Aid, 2007 for a similar
type of report).
The solutions promoted through these three discourses are narrow in
focus: they concentrate respectively on mitigation, adaptation funding, or
on the realm of the military. Once again, these approaches underrepresent
4 In his farewell address on 17 January 1961, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned
Americans: “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of
unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex”
(Eisenhower, 1961).
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the multicausal nature of environmentally-related migration and risk ne-
glecting the needs of environmental migrants themselves. A more subtle set
of actions is needed, including climate change mitigation and adaptation,
disaster risk reduction, migration management, development, land and
property rights arrangements, and capacity building – which is admittedly
more easily said than done.
Moreover, these three types of security-based discourses on environ-
mentally-related migration risk may result in more traditional types of
security measures being employed as coping mechanisms. The usage of a
security rationale may strengthen fears about immigration and subse-
quently trigger the adoption of extraordinary measures to counter the so-
called threat.5 In the Bangladeshi context, security-based discourses may
provide India with an additional justification to increase its border controls.
India already fenced a large part of Bangladesh’s borders, and Bangladeshis
are regularly being shot when trying to cross (HRW, 2010). Security-based
thinking on the so-called millions of “climate refugees” could complicate
the border situation even further. Once environmentally-related migrants
from Bangladesh are viewed and dealt with as threats, they may end up in
a negative spiral. Irregular migrants, once criminalized, are often com-
pelled to enter illegal networks, operate outside of official government
systems, participate only in unregulated and untaxed economies, and, in
the worst cases, become exposed to human trafficking and exploitation. To
this extent, constructing environmentally-related migration as a security
issue may result in the development of actual issues related to cross-border
criminal activities. The utmost danger of the security-based perspective on
environmentally-related migration is the ability of a discourse to become a
political reality.
Recognizing Multicausality and the Necessity of Coordination
The complex causal linkages between environmental change and migration
may thus lead to inaction or simulate narrow forms of governance that do
not do justice to environmentally-related migration challenges. As a result,
there is a considerable risk that the momentum of addressing environmen-
tally-related migration may be hijacked by pre-existing agendas (e.g.,
security, climate change mitigation or anti-migration policies). Neverthe-
less, multicausality should and can be dealt with and alternative ap-
5 See Buzan et al. (1998) for an analysis of securitization as a path towards extraordinary
measures.
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proaches hold promise for acknowledging multicausality and addressing it
in more satisfactory ways. To this end, there remain strong rights-based
arguments for developing policies and normative frameworks to tackle
with environmentally-related migration (Bell, 2004).
Effective normative frameworks on environmentally-related migra-
tion should acknowledge the multicausal origins of environmentally-re-
lated migration, while still pursuing pragmatic policy responses. Such
overarching governance strategies not only prevent inaction and misman-
agement, but will also more effectively protect the rights of migrants and
receiving communities by taking their particular and context-specific situ-
ations into account. The devil will be in the details, however, and some
specifics of such a strategy are outlined below.
Firstly, one-size-fits-all approaches should be avoided. Early scholar-
ship on the governance of environmentally-related migration proposed
universal standards somewhat analogous to the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees (William, 2008). However, such an approach
assumes that an individual protective status could be granted to a clear-cut
category of “environmental refugees” defined and enforced by the law. As
argued previously, the complex causality of migration in the context of
environmental change makes it difficult to distinguish, among individuals
displaced, between those displaced “because of” environmental change
and those for whom the environment was at best a negligible factor.
Moreover, the legal needs of environmentally-related migrants vary greatly,
depending on the form of migration: temporary and permanent migrants,
most evidently, have different needs. Different populations, in different
socio-economic or cultural settings, may also have specific needs. Technical
training may, for instance, be a key component of policies aiming at
enabling potential environmentally-related migrants to remain in situ
(CDKN, 2013). While this complexity represents arguably an insurmount-
able hurdle to the development of universal (and therefore abstract) stan-
dards, it does not necessarily impede localized and concrete policies target-
ing particular groups, localities, or countries. Therefore, instead of a top-
down approach, it may be advisable to collect, report, and evaluate existing
best practices for managing migration within the context of environmental
change. Such a process may develop something like a “multi-civilizational
forum of best practices,” whereby experiences are collected and further
circulated across communities, states and supra-national regions (Mayer,
2013). These best practices should be specific to different forms of migration,
distinguishing for instance between policies addressing spontaneous mi-
gration and those organizing community resettlement or emergency evacu-
ation.
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Secondly, the multicausal origin of environmentally-related migration
has significant institutional implications that should be acknowledged and
engaged with. These situations call for multi-sectoral coordination and
invite the mainstreaming of environmentally-related migration within a
host of existing policies and normative frameworks relating inter alia to
climate change mitigation and adaptation, human rights protection, devel-
opment, disaster risk reduction, land use and urban planning, humanitar-
ian relief, and migration management (McAdam, 2011).6 Rather than rely-
ing upon a specifically dedicated institution, a cluster approach is necessary
to coordinate different pre-existing institutions at multiple levels of gover-
nance. Such an approach may follow the example of the UN interagency
standing committee developed in the context of humanitarian relief (Messina,
2007; Jury and De Maio 2007).
A cluster approach is no panacea however. On the one hand, counter-
arguments may highlight the lack of clear demarcation of responsibilities
resulting from complex institutional arrangements (see discussion in Stod-
dard et al., 2007; Deschamp et al., 2010). In other words, while calling
everyone to act together, a risk is that cluster approaches do not efficiently
push anyone in particular to take any specific action (UNHCR, 2010).
However, the objection does not address the cluster approach as such, as
much as it criticizes certain institutional experiences. Much indeed depends
on the coherence of inter-institutional arrangements and their ability to
demarcate the responsibilities of the different partners. Conversely, the
main issue with the cluster approach may be linked to its lack of capacity to
attract resources. Because institutional coordination is often an opaque
process which does not call for democratic decisions, cluster approaches
may impede awareness raising, thus reducing the pressure on decision-
makers to bring in the necessary resources. A potential risk is that instead
of addressing the issue of environmentally-related migration in an active
manner, “coordination” may boil down to the creation of obscure inter-
institutional committees whose decisions do not lead to sufficient action.
However, in the context of strong engagement of the international commu-
nity, the cluster approach, if coordinated within effective institutional
arrangements, may be fruitful (Biermann and Boas, 2010:79). At the national
level, institutions have often been created to coordinate policies addressing
(directly or not) environmentally-related migration; in Bangladesh like
elsewhere, such coordination needs to be improved.
6 Tracey King suggested the creation of an International Coordinating Mechanism for
Environmental Displacement (ICMED) (King, 2006:559).
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Thirdly, in terms of substantial global governance, environmentally-
related migration should be approached with the notion of a global complex
interdependence in mind: just like no man is an island, no political (in)action
is without possible consequences on other social or political systems (Keohane
and Nye, 1977; Keohane and Victor, 2011). The multicausal nature of
environmentally-related migration calls for political action in many differ-
ent sectors, ranging from development and capacity building, to climate
change adaptation, to disaster risk reduction, to land law and so forth. The
issue is also often transboundary and, even when populations do not
physically cross national boundaries, environmentally-related migration
can move through complex global pathways to have indirect implications
worldwide. States are far from being wholly independent, and the suffering
of one population in Bangladesh has actual or possible, immediate or
delayed consequences in many other places of the world. For example, the
management of environmentally-related migration in Bangladesh has a
clear regional dimension in South Asia and relates to matters of regional
cooperation such as cross-border migration, transboundary water sharing
and disaster management issues. Unlike the standard security approach
problematized in the previous section, the perspective of a global complex
interdependence can encompass the myriad causal links between climate
change and migration. It can also justify engagement with the international
community to support states affected by internal migration, not just with a
view of defending the immediate interests of dominant states, but also with
a broader view towards the long-term consequences that any specific policy
is likely to have.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to problematize the current state of environmentally-
related migration response strategies, and offer new directions for dealing
with emergent environment-migration challenges. The first two sections
revealed the lack of effective and appropriate governance strategies that
define the issue area. Because the causality problem is not properly ad-
dressed, environmentally-related migration is oftentimes faced with either
a dearth of normative frameworks or possibly counter-productive re-
sponses following highly security-based approaches. In this context, the
third section suggested coordinated rights-based approaches capable of
coping with the multidimensional nature of the phenomenon – not just an
environmentally-”induced” movement of individuals, but also a phenom-
enon that occurs in specific socio-political, cultural, and demographic
settings. The central thesis of this article is that there is a need for careful
analyses that combine the observed and projected physical effects of envi-
192 ASIAN AND PACIFIC MIGRATION JOURNAL
ronmental change with the (non-environmental) context within which
environmentally-related migration plays out. Such approaches are particu-
larly salient for developing countries which face potentially acute environ-
mental changes and are characterized by socio-political systems struggling
to adapt to environmental stresses. Along this line, Bangladesh provides a
case in point, not only because of its vulnerability, but also because of the
lack of effective and appropriate governance strategies implemented there
to date.
While environmental changes have influenced human settlement and
mobility throughout history, observed trends send a clear message that the
scope of mobility has the potential to increase rapidly in the context of
pronounced anthropogenic environmental changes such as climate change.
It is therefore essential that work continues to unpack the characteristics of
environmentally-related migration through theoretical and empirical analy-
ses of unique case studies. Further research agendas should also be devel-
oped to examine such forms of governance and they should adopt methods
to analyze the dynamics of migration processes, taking local contexts into
account. For a country such as Bangladesh, the stakes could scarcely be
higher.
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